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Freedom to Strike: The Myth
of Voluntarism?
M. YUSUF CASSIM*
Holding trade unions liable in tort, especially in proceedings for
an interlocutory labor injunction, does not encourage trade unionism
and collective bargaining. In Dunlop S.A. Ltd. v. Metal and Allied
Workers Union,' the court, in an urgent application, enjoined a trade
union from inciting or in any other way instigating an unlawful strike
by the employees of the applicant's businesses located in various parts
of the country. Although it was only a temporary prohibition, it is
likely to have a permanent effect in matters concerning labor disputes.
The "postponement of collective action," observed a commentator,
"invariably means its abandonment."' 2 In Dunlop, Justice Booysen
rightly found that the respondents could not claim the protection of
the Labour Relations Act of 1956, 3 as that immunity extends to tor-
tious acts committed in the furtherance of a lawful strike, and is only
applicable to registered trade unions.
4
This Article examines the legal restrictions imposed by the La-
bour Relations Act on the right to strike, and argues that the law
plays too dominant a role in the affairs of industrial relations. The
legally-regulated system is in conflict with the basic principle of the
voluntarist philosophy of allowing industry to make its own bargains
and disagreements. This Article concludes that the law of strikes is
blatantly interventionist, and therefore likely to discredit the law
itself.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE RIGHT TO STRIKE
"Where the rights of labour are concerned," said Lord Wright in
Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co. v. Veitch, "the rights of the
employer are conditioned by the rights of the men to give or withhold
* Juris Doctorate candidate, University of California, Los Angeles, May 1989. J.S.M.
Stanford Law School, 1984; LL.B University of Natal, 1982; B.A. University of Witwaters-
rand, 1980. Member, Attorney's Bar, Transvaal, South Africa.
1. 1985 (1) S.A. 177(D).
2. See generally 0. KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR AND THE LAW (2d ed. 1977).
3. Labour Relations Act, No. 28 of 1956 (South Africa 1956).
4. 1985 (1) S.A. 177(D).
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
their services. The right of the workmen to strike is an essential ele-
ment in the principle of collective bargaining." 5 The Wiehahn Com-
mission 6 found that the mandatory conciliatory procedures that
employees must follow, according to the Labour Relations Act of
19567 (the LRA), before resorting to strike action, do not negate the
rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining in South
Africa. Indeed the Commission's report supports a regulated system
to control industrial conflict.
8
Roger Rideout's synopsis of Kahn-Freund and Hepple's ration-
ale for the need to permit resort to strike as a means of enforcing and
improving terms of employment is instructive. 9
First, the right to strike is the means by which unions, as bar-
gaining agents, equate their position with that of the employer. This
is known as the equilibrium function. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
aptly noted:
Combination on the one side is patent and powerful. Combination
on the other is the necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle
is to be carried on in a fair and equal way . . . If it be true that
workingmen may combine with a view, among other things, to get-
ting as much as they can for their labor, just as capital may com-
bine with a view to getting the greatest possible return, it must be
true that, when combined, they have the same liberty that com-
bined capital has, to support their interest by argument, persua-
sion, and the bestowal or refusal of those advantages which they
otherwise lawfully control. 10
Nowhere is the myth of freedom of contract more prevalent than in
the employment contract. The worker as an individual has to accept
the conditions which the employer offers. The ensuing relationship is
"between a bearer of power and one who is not a bearer of power."II
It is through workers acting in solidarity that a semblance of parity is
struck, making collective bargaining viable.
5. [1942] A.C. 435, 463.
6. The South African government appointed a commission to investigate and propose
changes to the existing labor laws. N. Wiehahn was appointed chairperson of this commission.
7. Supra note 3.
8. See N. WIEHAHN, THE COMPLETE WIEHAHN REPORT 428, 548 (1982).
9. R. RIDEOUT & J. DYSON, RIDEOUT'S PRINCIPLES OF LABOUR LAW 451 (4th ed.
1976). See also 0. KAHN-FREUND & B. HEPPLE, LAWS AGAINST STRIKES 4-8 (1972).
10. Vegelahn v. Gunther, 167 Mass. 92, 108, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Justice Holmes had previously formulated this argument in Privilege, Malice and
Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1894).
11. 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 2, at 6.
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Second, the sanction of strike, or threat to strike, deters manage-
ment from unilaterally changing conditions of work without prior
consultation. The deterrent value is particularly effective in enforcing
collective agreements, those "autonomous rules" created by collective
bargaining.
Third, a legal compulsion to work is abhorrent to systems of law
imbued with a liberal tradition. Thus, workers cannot be forbidden to
strike simply because they do so in concert with others.
Last, the strike at times is a necessary release of psychological
tension. The above reasons do not suggest that any legal restriction
upon industrial action is detrimental to collective bargaining. For in-
stance, the Beampte in Germany, having a high degree of fidelity to
the State by virtue of his status, is generally considered as being un-
able to strike. 12 Freedom to strike should not, however, be suppressed
to the extent of making the rights to associate and to bargain illusory.
WHAT IS A STRIKE?
The complex definition of strike, found in the Labour Relations
Act, comprises three requirements: (i) there must be a combination of
persons; (ii) ceasing to work or in any other material respect interfer-
ing with their terms of employment; and (iii) with the object of induc-
ing or compelling the employer either to comply with any demands,
or to refrain from changing any terms of employment, or to restore
any conditions previously in operation, or to agree to employ, suspend
or terminate the employment of any person.' 3
In essence, a strike is a concerted withdrawal of labor pursuant
to an industrial objective or any other matter. Clearly, the LRA ex-
tends liability extensively, and the increasingly popular tactical weap-
ons of collective bargaining, such as the "go-slow,"' 14 the "work-to-
rule" 5 and the "overtime ban" fall within the scope of strike action.
Arguably, a refusal to cooperate by workers may sufficiently interfere
12. Id. at 234.
13. Labour Relations Act, supra note 3, § 1.
14. A go-slow is generally regarded as a breach of "an implied undertaking of the worker
that, in so far as he is capable of doing so, he should work at a reasonable speed." 0. KAHN-
FREUND, supra note 2, at 265.
15. "A work-to-rule may take many different forms, some of which may involve a breach
of contracts of employment... [tihe worker is not required to do more for his employer than
what his contract requires," but needs to carry out the lawful instructions of the employer not
in an unreasonable way which will have the effect of disrupting the employer's business. B.
HEPPLE, HEPPLE & O'HIGGINS, EMPLOYMENT LAW 137 (4th ed. 1981).
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with the employment relationship to give rise to a strike. The English
Court of Appeal, in Secretary of State Employment v. A.S.L.E.F. (No.
2),16 censored collective action that resulted in the individual em-
ployee breaching his implied duty not to disrupt the employer's busi-
ness. In that case the railwaymens' justification for their go-slow and
work-to-rule as a strict observation of railway rules and regulations
was not acceptable. They deliberately breached their implied obliga-
tion to make every effort to facilitate the working of trains and the
prevention and avoidance of delay. Lord Denning emphasized the
wilfullness of the disruption:
If he, with the others, takes steps wilfully to disrupt the undertak-
ing, to produce chaos so that it will not run as it should, then each
one who is a party to those steps is guilty of a breach of his con-
tract. It is no answer for any one of them to say 'I am only obeying
the rule book', or 'I am not bound to do more than a 40 hour
week.' That would be all very well if done in good faith without
any wilful disruption of service; but what makes it wrong is the
object with which it is done. 17
LEGAL CONTROL OF STRIKES
The LRA places certain specific limitations on the right to strike.
Ringrose summarized the restrictions set forth in section 65 of the
LRA as follows:
There is an absolute prohibition of strikes by:
(i) employees covered by any agreement or award which is le-
gally binding in terms of the Labor Relations Act, and which cov-
ers the matter in dispute, at any time during the currency of such
agreement or award;
(ii) employees who are covered by a wage determination pub-
lished in terms of the Wage Act, or who are covered by any other
16. Secretary of State for Employment v. A.S.L.E.F. (No. 2), [1972] 2 All E.R. 949
(C.A.).
17. Id. at 967. Lord Denning elaborated as to how the Railways Board rule book, is to be
reasonably construed:
They must be construed according to the usual course of dealing and to the way they
have been applied in practice. When the rules are so construed the railway system, as
we all know, works efficiently and safely. But if some of these rules are construed
unreasonably, as, for instance, the driver takes too long examining his engine or see-
ing that all is in order, the system may be in danger of being disrupted. It is only
when they are construed unreasonably that the railway system grinds to a halt. It is,
I should think, clearly a breach of contract first to construe the rules unreasonably,
and then to put that unreasonable construction into practice.
Id. at 965.
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order or wage regulating measure that deals with the matter in dis-
pute, if these have been in operation for less than a year;
(iii) the employees of a local authority, or of an employer who
provides essential services, at any time; (iv) employees whose ob-
ject is to achieve some purpose unrelated to terms or conditions of
employment.
There is a conditional prohibition:
Where the prohibitions referred to in (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) above do
not apply, striking remains illegal for any employee or any other
person if there is an industrial council with jurisdiction, until
either:
(i) the council has reported on the dispute in writing to the minis-
ter; or (ii) a period of 30 days has elapsed from the date on which
the dispute was referred to the council, or such further period as
the council may fix has expired; whichever happens first.
If the industrial council's constitution provides for the com-
pulsory reference of disputes to arbitration, however, striking by
members of a party to the council remains illegal indefinitely.
If there is no industrial council having jurisdiction over their
employment, employees may not strike until application has been
made for a conciliation board and one of the following events has
occurred:
(i) a board has been established and has reported to the minister
in writing; or (ii) a period of 30 days had elapsed from the date
on which the minister approved of a board, or such further period
as the board may fix; or
(iii) the minister has refused to approve the establishment of a
board; or
(iv) 30 days have elapsed since application was made for a board
and the minister has not taken a decision.
On the other hand, if the industrial council or conciliation
board considering a dispute decides to refer it to arbitration ac-
cording to the terms of the Act (i.e. voluntary arbitration), striking
is illegal pending the making of an award or the cessation of arbi-
tration proceedings, whichever comes first.
There remains one more condition to be complied with if a
strike is to be legally declared by a registered trade union; a major-
ity of the paid-up members of the union must, by secret ballot,
have indicated that they are in favor of a strike.'
8
Despite these limitations, however, work stoppage activity is a
18. R. RINGROSE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF EMPLOYMENT 219-20 (2d ed. 1983).
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common occurrence in South Africa; indeed most strikes are invaria-
bly illegal in terms of the LRA. 19
The LRA permits strike action in form only. In substance, the
provisions of section 65 considerably weaken the collective bargaining
process in South Africa. Viewed in isolation some of the restrictions
are justifiable. For instance, the outlawing of strikes where the na-
tional safety or health may be imperiled is a legitimate protection
against the costs of curtailing bargaining power. On the other hand,
the imposition of a "cooling-off" period in every instance of industrial
conflict undermines the process of counteracting the inherently supe-
rior collective power of the employer.
20
The regulation of strike action by the LRA is not, however, nec-
essarily anachronistic, nor is it a serious deprivation of any fundamen-
tal right. 2 1 Workers on strike not only disrupt their contractual
relationship with their employer, but also pose potential risk of injury
and damage to the public at large. Otto Kahn-Freund recognizes this
feature of striking:
The centralization not only of the supply of services, but also of
some essential goods means that any stoppage or delay or slowing
down is likely to expose to serious hardship masses of people who
do not have the slightest influence on the outcome of the dis-
pute . . . [t]he victim of this change in the target and nature of
many strikes is to an appreciable extent the working class itself.
2 2
19. Strikes in South Africa in the period 1973-1982."
Years 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Total Number of
Strikes 370 384 274 245 90 106 101 207 342 281
No. of workers involved 98378 59244 23323 28013 15304 14160 22803 61785 92842 189022
The above table is extracted from SOUTH AFRICAN REVIEW: SOME FOUNDATIONS, NEW
FACADES 220 (1983), which in turn is based on information supplied by the Department of
Manpower (DOM). The 1982 figures are however based on independent research and do not
include the Aggett political strikes. According to figures released by the Minister of Man-
power a total of 60,332 workers took part in 336 strikes in 1983 resulting in a loss of 969,504
manhours. An additional 27,256 manhours were lost through work stoppages by 4,137 work-
ers. (Hansard 21 January 1984, Questions: Col. 274). On the other hand the Willy Bendix's
Industrial Relations Trend Consultant's survey shows that there were 190 strikes in 1983 (i.e.,
56.5% of the official figure) resulting in a loss of 1,012,381 manhours. "Industrial Monitor"
Indicator 2 (1984) 5. In 1984, according to the DOM, there were 469 strikes and work stop-
pages involving 181,942 workers, 80% of which lasted less than three days. Commentary on
the 1984 Manpower Report Tabled in Parliament, Daily News, Apr. 23, 1985.
20. See 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 2, at 1-17.
21. See id. at 17.
22. 0. KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR RELATIONS: HERITAGE AND ADJUSTMENT 76-77
(1979).
286 [Vol. 11:281
1989] Freedom to Strike
Let us briefly examine the extent to which the right to strike is a
fundamental right in some of the other developed nations.
Although the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 in the
United States guarantees to employees the right to engage in con-
certed activities, 23 that right is not an unqualified one:
(i) Striking for certain prescribed objectives, inter alia; secondary
purposes, strikes for work-assignment purposes and those for recogni-
tion as a bargaining agent when another union is lawfully
recognized.24
(ii) Section 8(d) provides for the familiar "cooling off" period of
sixty days before a union can resort to strike to modify or terminate
an existing collective bargaining agreement. Within thirty days after
giving notice of the intention to strike, the union must also notify the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and the appropriate state
mediation agency of the existence of the dispute. During the sixty-
day notice period to the employer, the workers continue to render
their services to the employer. 25 In the health care industry the "cool-
23. Section 7 of the NLRA provides that:
[E]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as au-
thorized in section 8(a)(3).
National Labor Relations Act of 1935, § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935). See also sections 8(a) and
8(b)(I)(A) which specifically protect the right to strike from infringement by an employer or by
a union respectively.
24. Id. § 8(b)(4). Inducements or encouragements to withhold services directed at those
who normally deal with the disputed work are deemed primary, whereas inducement and en-
couragements directed at other persons are deemed secondary, for example, picketing at a gate
reserved for those whose contracts are not related to the work in dispute. See A.B.A. SEC.
LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L., 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOUR LAW 1143 (2d ed. 1983). Section
8(b)(4)(D) prohibits industrial action where the object is to force the employer to assign partic-
ular work to employees in a particular labor organization to the exclusion of other employees.
Thus unions cannot resort to strike action in the traditional jurisdictional dispute, in which
two unions have collective bargaining agreements with one employer and each claims the work
for its members. See New Orleans Typographical Union Local No. 17 v. National Labor
Relations Board, 368 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1966). Section 8(b)(4)(C) prohibits a union from
engaging in economic pressure to require an employer to recognize or bargain with a particular
labor organization as the representative of its employees where there already exists another
union certified as the bargaining representative of its employees. C. MORRIS, supra note 24,
ch. 23.
25. In Hooker Chemicals and Plastic Corp., 224 N.L.R.B. 1535 (1976), the National
Labor Relations Board held that where one party gives the sixty-day notice but does not file
the thirty-day notice with the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) until after
more than thirty days following the sixty-day notice, the other party must nevertheless observe
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
ing off" period is ninety days, and in the event of failure to reach
settlement section 8(g) requires the Union to give the institution con-
cerned a further ten-day notice of its intent to strike.
(iii) Like public employees in South Africa, there is an absolute pro-
hibition against striking by employees of the federal government. 2
6
(iv) Strikes that imperil the national health or safety may, at the
instigation of the President, be enjoined for eighty days under Title II
of the Taft-Haftley Act, during which time various mediation and
fact-finding services are made available to the parties.
27
In Great Britain there is no positive right to strike. The right is
seen simply as "a right to withdraw labor in combination without be-
ing subject to legal consequences." 28  This freedom, without which
workers could not bargain collectively, derives from the language of
statutes which protect those who act "in contemplation or further-
ance of a trade dispute" from judge-made liabilities for tort and crime.
Before proceeding to list the limitations on liberty to engage in
industrial action, it is significant to observe that recent legislation is
justified as "there can be no salvation for Britain until the special priv-
ileges granted to the trade unions three-quarters of a century ago are
revoked."'29 The present policy is thus seen as designed to curb collec-
tive bargaining and thereby favoring the employer. 30 The regulation
of industrial action ensures that "the collective strength of workers is
to be limited boundaries of the employment unit. ' ' 31 Thus:
(i) Workers are not permitted to take industrial relation to a trade
a thirty-day moratorium following the initiating party's untimely mediation notice before call-
ing a strike or lockout. Id. at 1538.
26. 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1980). See also United Federation of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F.
Supp. 879, 883 (D.D.C. 1971), in which a three-judge district court held that "there is no
constitutional right to strike" and "the right to strike cannot be considered a 'fundamental'
right." Id. at 883.
27. See generally Rehmus, The Operation of the National Emergency Provisions of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 62 YALE L.J. 1047 (1953).
28. Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations, 1965-1968 Cmnd.
3623 para. 935. See generally K. WEDDERBURN, THE WORKER AND THE LAW chs. 7, 8 (2d
ed. 1971). See also K. Wedderburn, Labour Law and Labour Relations in Britain, 10 BRIT. J.
INDUS. RELATIONS 270 (1972); 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 2, ch. 8; and 0. KAHN-
FREUND & B. HEPPLE, supra note 9.
29. F. HAYEK, 1980's UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE UNIONS 52-58 (1980); F. HAYEK, 3
LAW LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 80-97 (1979),
30. See Lord Wedderburn, Labor Law Now-A Hold and Nudge, 13 I.L.J. 73, 80-81
(1984).
31. LORD WEDDERBURN OF CHARLTON, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND THE LAW IN
THE 1980'S: ISSUES AND FUTURE TRENDS 22 (to be published) (eds. P. Fosh and C. Littler).
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dispute when their own employer is not a party of the dispute.32
(ii) Only disputes between workers and their own employer are al-
lowed. Moreover, the dispute must relate wholly or mainly to the
workers' own conditions, i.e., a genuine dispute between an employer
and his employees.
33
(iii) There exists no protection with respect to industrial action in-
tended to put pressure on employers to maintain union and recogni-
tion only practices.
34
(iv) The right of peaceful picketing is limited to "attendance at or
near" a worker's own place of work.35
32. The Employment Act, 1980, § 17. For Lord Wedderburn, "the essence of autono-
mous trade unionism has always been effective solidarity across the lines of employment so
that the strong can aid the weak." See The New Framework in Europe in INTERNATIONAL
ISSUES IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 34, 56 (1982). Section 17 exposes all forms of sympathetic
and solidarity action to tortious liability for any consequential injury caused in the perform-
ance of commercial contracts, unless the target "associated employer" is involved directly in
supply of goods or services in substitution for those disrupted in the dispute, or where the
supply turns out to be under a commercial contract made between the primary and the secon-
dary employer. The Employment Act, 1980, § 17. These exemptions have been restrictively
interpreted. Thus, where a ship owned by "A" and chartered to "B" was blocked (because of
underpayment of crew) while in port by the International Transport Federation by persuading
lock-keepers to refuse to let the ship out, in breach of their contracts of employment, "A" was
granted an injunction. The exception to liability for secondary action was not available in as
much as the employer in dispute "A" and the employer in the secondary action (employer of
the lock-keepers) were not in direct contractual relationship. The contract for the use of the
dock was between the port authority and the charterer "B." See Marina Shipping Ltd. v.
Laughton, [1982] 1 All E.R. 481 (C.A.). In Merkur Island Shipping Corporation v. Laughton,
[1983] 2 W.C.R. 778 (H.L.), the House of Lords confirmed the approach of the Court of
Appeal, thereby rendering most backing of solidarity action as unlawful.
33. The Employment Act, 1982, § 18. Section 29(1) of the Trade Union Labor Relations
Act of 1974, now repealed, covered disputes between employers and workers or between work-
ers and workers which were connected with widely couched matters concerning working as
well as trade union activities. In this way, participants in industrial action within the definition
of a trade dispute (the golden formula) were protected against tortious liability.
34. The Employment Act, 1982, § 14. If any person (in practice, a union) exerts indus-
trial pressure in order to secure a union-labor-only clause in a contract, to induce an unlawful
refusal to contract or tender on the ground of the employment of non-union labor, or to inter-
fere with the supply of goods or services on that ground, the usual immunities from suit in tort
under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Act 1974 (section 13) are expressly withdrawn
from that industrial pressure, so that the union may be sued for an injunction and damages.
See Lewis & Simpson, Disorganizing Industrial Relations: An Analysis of sections 2-8 and 10-14
of the Employment Act 1982, 11 I.L.J. 228 (1982).
35. The Employment Act, 1980, § 16. Pickets are in any event not immune from prose-
cution of a number of minor criminal offenses; not only under the Highway Act and the Police
Act, but also under section 7 of the Criminal and Protection of Property Act 1875 in addition
to local by-laws. They may also commit various torts, for example nuisance; see Hubbard v.
Pitt, [1975] I.C.R. 308 (C.A.); Kavanagh v. Hiscock, [1974] I.C.R. 282 (Q.B.). See generally
R. LEWIS & B. SIMPSON, STRIKING A BALANCE EMPLOYMENT LAW AFTER THE 1980 ACT
153-80 (1981).
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(v) Trade Unions are liable for tortious wrongs arising from indus-
trial conflict with respect to acts authorized or endorsed by a list of
responsible persons, who are by statute declared to be agents of the
union.36 Strikes and other industrial action not enjoying the protec-
tion of the law may thus well bankrupt the union. Amounts of dam-
ages up to 250,000 pounds for a union of 100,000 members or more
can be awarded.
37
(vi) The Trade Union Act of 1984, provides that the union and its
officials must ensure, prior to authorizing or endorsing a strike or
other industrial action, that a ballot is held: Failure to receive major-
ity support results in tortious liability for injury caused as a result of
the industrial action.
38
(vii) The Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875, makes it
an offense for any person to breach a contract of employment (e.g., by
going on strike) in circumstances where the person appreciates or has
reasonable cause to believe that human life is likely to be endangered,
or that valuable property is likely to be exposed to destruction or seri-
ous damage.
39
(viii) In addition to the previously described restrictions on the pur-
suit of industrial action in the United Kingdom, the Minister of
Crown is empowered for reasons of national security to prevent work-
ers rendering essential services from being represented by a union.40
German workers enjoy the freedom to abstain from work collec-
36. The Employment Act, 1982, § 15. See Clark & Wedderburn, Modern Labor Law:
Problems, Functions and Policies in LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: BUILDING
ON KAHN-FREUND 202 (Lord Wedderburn, R. Lewis & J. Clark eds. 1983).
37. The Employment Act, 1982, § 16. Section 16 sets forth the maximum amounts of
damages to be awarded against various tortious actions (other than actions for personal injury
or arising out of the ownership, occupation, possession, control or use of property where the
maximum does not apply). The limits are:
(a) £10,000 if the union has less than 5,000 members;
(b) £50,000 if over 5,000 but less than 25,000 members;
(c) £125,000 if over 25,000 but less than 100,000 members; and
(d) £250,000 if over 100,000 members.
Id. § 16(3).
38. The Act received Royal Assent on July 26, 1984. See Trade Union Act, 1984, §§ 10,
11.
39. Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, § 5. See also the Merchant Ship-
ping Act, 1970. In terms of section 42, a seaman abroad and on board are prohibited from
striking. Id. § 42.
40. Employment Protection (Consolidated) Act, 1978, § 138(4). Thus, in 1984 the Min-
ister decreed that the 5,000 civil servants involved in the secret gathering of electronic intelli-
gence at the government communications headquarters in Cheltenham fell outside the scope of
statutory rights to organize and belong to a union.
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tively in order to achieve better wages and working conditions. The
liberty to strike is, however, confined by other legal rules.
4'
THE UNION STRIKE
Strike action can only be initiated through a procedure that
grants joint decision making to members. An essential component of
this procedure is balloting. The approval of the main executive board
is required and commences after the failure of collective bargaining.
The executive board will consider the financial condition of the
branch union contemplating a strike, the possibility of a lockout, as
well as the existence of a peace obligation, before reaching a decision
to hold a ballot. Where the strike ballot takes place and the required
majority is attained, the executive board proclaims a specified day to
strike.
42
Strikers are protected against dismissal or other employer sanc-
tions. The Union, however, is responsible for the performance of
emergency work, as well as preventing excesses (e.g., picketing which
may cause injury to property) during the strike.43
Non-union strikes are illegal;44 the justification being that there
exists a statutory settlement procedure. Non-union strikers have in-
geniously succeeded in classifying their action as a demonstration,
protected by freedom of speech.
Clearly, then, if German law is regarded as recognizing the right
to strike, our law is as commendable. Striking in Germany is lawful
when it concerns a conflict of interest and is resorted to only after the
procedures for settlement have been exhausted. 45 Similarly, South
African legislation regulating industrial action provides for a
mandatory conflict resolution process46 and arguably is no more Dra-
41. The right to strike in union-organized strikes was recognized by the constitution of
the states after 1945 and, uniformly for the German Federal Republic, by the decision of
January 28, 1955 and April 21, 1971 of the Big Senate of the Federal Labor Court. The trade-
union strike suspends the obligation to work, and since April 1971 the Court restricts lock-
outs to suspension of the payment of wages, thus preventing the collective dismissal of the
workers. See generally INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT-A COMPARATIVE LEGAL SURVEY chs. 1, 3
and 5 (B. Aaron & K. Wedderburn ed. 1972). See specifically Th. Ramm, Federal Republic of
Germany in 5 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA FOR LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELA-
TIONS 135-43 (R. Blanpain ed. 1979).
42. See id. para. 609-10.
43. Id. para. 611.
44. Id. para. 613.
45. Id. para. 617. Strike action cannot be used in legal conflicts, which are adjudicated
by the labor court.
46. Labour Relations Act, supra note 3, § 65.
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conian than the systems surveyed above. We shall again return to this
theme.
CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR INDUSTRIAL ACTION
The object of the LRA is to avoid industrial disruption. The Act
provides for a voluntary system of self-regulation by management and
labor, mediation and arbitration, compulsory conciliation, and a
structure to develop and promote fair employment practices. 47 Coter-
minously, strikes and lock-outs are extensively regulated, permitting
such action in well-defined circumstances.
Any person partaking in a strike or instigating or inciting any
employee to strike in contravention of section 65 commits a crime,
punishable by a fine up to 2,000,000 Rand or imprisonment for a pe-
riod not in excess of two years, which may be imposed without a fine,
or both.
48
The following categories of employees commit the statutory of-
fense when striking. Any person instigating or inciting any of these
employees to strike also runs afoul of section 65.
(a) Employees rendering essential services (i.e., those engaged in
providing light, power, water, sanitation, passenger transportation, or
fire extinguishing services and those employed by local authorities are
prohibited from striking in any circumstance.
49
(b) Employees whose terms and conditions of employment are gov-
erned by an industrial council agreement, award, or determination
cannot take strike action. In addition, strike action over a wage dis-
pute is prohibited during the first year in which a wage determination
is in operation.
50
47. See generally Labour Relations Act, supra note 3.
48. Id. § 65(3).
49. Id. §§ 65(l)(c), 46. In terms of other statutes, teachers, employees of provincial au-
thorities and municipalities, doctors, dentists, pharmacists and psychologists employed by the
state, nurses, and all hospital employees are also prohibited from striking. See Nursing Act,
No. 50 of 1978, and the Medical, Dental and Supplementary Health Service Professions
Amendment Act, 1978.
50. Section 65(1)(d) ensures that the parties abide by the agreements that result from the
process of collective bargaining. Section 23 vests upon industrial councils the duty to negotiate
agreements between employer and employee parties that not only will prevent disputes from
arising, but will also settle any disputes that have arisen. An arbitration award deals with the
subject-matter of the dispute referred by the employer and employees, and its effect is final and
binding. See Labour Relations Act, supra note 3, § 49(1). Section 65(l)(b) refers to a determi-
nation in terms of the Wages Act, 1957, which deals with wages and other conditions of em-
ployment made binding on employers and for the benefit of employees who are not organized
as a unit to command collective bargaining. Id. § 2(3).
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(c) In all other cases, there is a mandatory "cooling-off" phase
before employees may lawfully strike. A dispute must be referred to
the industrial council, where one has been established and where the
disputants are parties thereto, which has thirty days to resolve the
matter. In the absence of such a council, the party contemplating
strike action must apply for the establishment of an ad hoc board,
which, if constituted, will attempt to conciliate and reach a settle-
ment. 51 If the council or conciliation board, fails to settle a dispute,
then strike action will be permissible provided a majority of workers
vote by secret ballot to strike.
52
Section 65 of the LRA is further reinforced. First, it is an offense
for a registered trade union, its office-bearers, officials, or members to
partake in or induce others to strike where the union is party to an
industrial council, the constitution of which provides that disputes
that cannot be settled are referred to arbitration.5 3 Second, a conspir-
acy to commit any act which constitutes a strike is illegal. 54 Third,
trade unions are prohibited from rendering financial assistance for
purposes of sustaining an illegal strike.
55
PICKETING
Strikers who picket have not merely withdrawn their own labor,
but seek to directly persuade others to join their side of the dispute.
Picketing is generally considered as coercing other individuals and
causing public disorder.
A picket, in its very nature ... tends and is designed by physical
intimidation, to deter other men from seeking employment in
places vacated by the strikers. It tends and is designed to drive
business away from the boycotted place, not by the legitimate
methods of persuasion, but by the illegitimate means of physical
51. A conciliation board consists of an equal number of representatives of the employer
and the employee parties concerned and is established by the Minister to settle a dispute. Id.
§ 35. Where the Minister refuses to appoint a conciliation board, the union can lawfully strike.
Otherwise, the union has to await the report of the board. This vests in the Minister the power
to avoid strike action, moreover the Minister can extend the period within which the board has
to report in its attempts to settle the dispute. Id. § 65(i), (ii).
52. Id. § 65(2)(b).
53. Id. § 65(2)(a).
54. See section 65(1)(a), which provides "No employee shall in pursuance of any combi-
nation, agreement or understanding. . . commit or... incite, instigate, command, aid.., any
employee so to commit or so to take part in committing, any act or omission contemplated in
paragraphs (a) or (b) of the definition of 'strike' . . . other than a purpose referred to in para-
graph (ii) of the said definition." Id. § 65 (l)(a).
55. Id. § 65(3)(A).
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intimidation and fear. Crowds naturally collect, disturbances of
the peace are always imminent and of frequent occurrence. Many
peaceful citizens, men and women, are always deterred by physical
trepidation from entering places of business so under a boycott pa-
trol. It is idle to split hairs upon so plain a proposition, and to say
that the picket may consist of nothing more than a single individ-
ual peacefully endeavoring by persuasion to prevent customers
from entering the boycotted place. The plain facts are always at
variance with such refinements of reason.
56
There may, however, be instances of peaceful picketing which
aim to communicate a cause to the public. It is submitted that picket-
ing is not inherently intimidating and, therefore, not per se unlawful.
Indeed, to the United States Supreme Court, picketing is a means of
publishing the facts of a labor dispute and an exercise of freedom of
speech. 57 Clearly, picketing serves effective organizational and recog-
nition functions. At an incipient stage of organization, a strike alone
will likely be ineffective, while picketing can result in the interruption
of deliveries to and pick-ups from the employer and of other forms of
patronage by customers. The resulting economic losses may well in-
duce the employer to recognize the union and the employees to join
the union.
Picketing that results in any employee being incited or instigated
to partake in a strike or to continue a strike in contravention of sec-
tion 65, is declared unlawful.5 8 Moreover, the LRA does not provide
any protection to peaceful pickets. Of course, if picketing is violent,
there will be criminal liability for assault, malicious injury to prop-
erty, intimidation 59 and public order offenses as there would be in any
other circumstance. However, even peaceful picketing may constitute
the offenses of trespassing,6° squatting, 6' or obstructing roads and
56. Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70, 79, 103 P. 324, 328 (1909).
57. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
58. See Labour Relations Act, supra note 3, § 65(l).
59. See Intimidation Act, No. 72 of 1982, § 1.
60. Trespass Act, No. 6 of 1959, § 1. It would appear that even if an employer wrong-
fully or unlawfully purports to terminate a contract of employment, the employee has no right
to remain upon the employer's premises. See Venter v. Livini, 1950 (1) S.A. 524 (T); Kew
Hotel (Pty) Ltd. v. Hartman, 1935 S.A. 684 (N.P.D.). In R. v. Smit, 1955 (1) S.A. 239
(C.P.D.), Justice Watermeyer confirmed the conviction of the appellant on a charge of trespass
on the basis that the:
[a]ppellant knew that he was dismissed from employment, and after dismissal he was
warned not to enter the premises. Notwithstanding such warning he entered the
premises. His entry was therefore willful. He entered not to work but to participate
in a strike which was in breach of his contract of employment. Nowhere in his evi-
dence did the appellant say that he thought he had the right to enter the premises,
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thoroughfares. 62 There is also the risk of contravening the Internal
Security Act, by committing the serious statutory crimes of subver-
sion and attending a prohibited gathering. 63
CIVIL LIABILITY FOR INDUSTRIAL ACTION
The character and objects of trade unions are such that their ac-
tivities constantly interfere with the labor and trade activities of
others, making them potentially liable in contract and tort.
CONTRACT
The legal position of the individual who takes part in industrial
action depends upon the effect of that action on his contract of em-
ployment. A concerted refusal by striking workers to carry out their
contractual duties is always a breach of contract." Even if the strike
is legal, the common law entitles the employer to dismiss the em-
ployee who refuses to perform his contractual obligations.65 A "go-
slow" is a breach of contract because it is the implied duty of the
worker that, in so far as he is capable of doing so, he should work at a
reasonable speed. An overtime ban would be a breach of contract if
the employer is entitled under the contract to demand overtime, but
not if overtime is genuinely voluntary on the part of the employee.66
Where workers engage in strike action, the contractual concepts of
"breach going to the root" and "repudiation" overlap, enabling the
and I am satisfied that the Crown established not only an unlawful entry but also a
willful trespass.
Id. at 244.
61. Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, No. 52 of 1951, § 1.
62. A number of provincial and local enactments prohibit the encumbering of streets,
footways and roads or the obstruction of free passage along them. See, e.g., § 130(1) of the
Uniform Road Traffic Ordinance. See also J. MILTON & N. FULLER, SOUTH AFRICAN CRIMI-
NAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: STATUTORY OFFENSES 640 (1971).
63. See §§ 54 and 57 of the Internal Security Act, No. 74 of 1982, respectively. Any
person who interrupts any industry or undertaking with the aim of bringing about industrial or
economic change commits the offense of subversion and is liable on conviction to a sentence of
imprisonment not exceeding twenty years, and where the accused could foresee violence as a
result of his conduct to a period not exceeding twenty-five years. Id. § 54(l)(b), (2)(b), (2)(i)-
(ii).
64. See Simmons v. Hoover, Ltd., [1977] I.C.R. 61, 70; Stratford & Son Ltd. v. Lindley,
[1905] A.C. 269, 335 (H.L.); Haddow v. Inner London Education Authority, [1979] I.C.R.
202.
65. Ngewu v. Union Co-op Bark and Sugar, 1982 (4) S.A. 390, 405 (N); R. v. Smit, 1955
(1) S.A. 239, 241(H) (C.P.D.).
66. See supra note 15.
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employer to dismiss the striking workers. 67
In practice, however, employers do not sue their employees for
breach of contract. Workers are usually fired, making it pointless to
seek damages against the individual worker. 68 This amount is small
in comparision to the costs and inconvenience of litigation and recov-
ery of any award. Furthermore, where negotiations are in progress,
suing employees for damages can only exacerbate the employer's rela-
tions with the employees, who in all likelihood will appear in court
only when the disruption is over.
The employers' ability to dismiss striking workers, even those on
a lawful strike, is not considered a serious impediment to the collec-
tive forces embroiled in a dispute. The law of tort, on the other hand,
is a major weapon in the armory of the employer not only against
67. See R. CHRISTIE, THE LAW OF CONTRACT IN SOUTH AFRICA 496-501 (1981). In
Simmons v. Hoover, Ltd., [1977] I.C.R. 61, the Employment Appeal Tribunal said that "a
settled, confirmed and continued intention on the part of the employee not to do any of the
work which under his contract he had been engaged to do, which was the whole purpose of the
contract... appears to us to be repudiatory of the contract of employment." Id. at 76. Thus,
without an implied obligation not to wilfully disrupt (which is hard to conceive of) any indus-
trial action involves a breach of contract. However, it may well be that there are forms of
work-to-rule which are not more than a strict application of the rules as properly construed,
and thus not amounting to a breach. A withdrawal of voluntary overtime clearly does not
involve a breach of contract. See supra note 15. See also Power Packing Casemakers Ltd. v.
Faust, [1981] I.C.R. 484.
68. It is submitted that liability of the employee is limited to the loss caused by his own
breach of contract, even though he knew his fellow workers also intended to break their con-
tracts at the same time. Ringrose states that the damages awarded to the employer will be
limited to the value of the employee's services during the period between the date he actually
leaves and the date he would have been entitled to leave if he had given notice. See R. RING-
ROSE, supra note 18, at 56. In addition, damage to the employer includes the cost to the
employer of hiring a substitute worker. Thus, the employer is under a duty to mitigate his
damages. See Victoria Falls & Transvaal Co., Ltd. v. Consolidated Langlaate Mines, Ltd.,
1915 A.D. 1; Holmdene Brickworks (Pty) Ltd. v. Roberts Construction Ltd., 1977 (3) S.A.
670, 689(A). Justice Corbett makes the point that the law requires that the victim of the breach
must have acted reasonably in the adoption of remedial measures. The Basic Conditions of
Employment Act, 1983, stipulates the notice period that an employee must give to terminate
the contract of employment. This cannot be less than one work day's notice during the first
four weeks of employment. After the first four weeks of employment, in the case of weekly
employers, it must be one week's notice. In the case of a monthly employee, it must be two
week's notice. Basic Conditions of Employment Act, No. 3 of 1983, § 14. The employee
failing to so terminate the contract of employment commits a criminal offense. Recovery of
the amounts payable under section 14 by way of civil action is precluded, however, except in
an amount in excess of the minimum laid down by section 14 and owing in terms of the
contract of employment. In addition, civil action is precluded where the Attorney-General has
declined to prosecute or the employee has been acquitted on the relevant charge. Id. § 30. See
Manoim v. Veneered Furniture Manufacturers, 1934 A.D. 237; Lichtman v. Friedland, 1940
T.P.D. 313; MacVoi (Pty) Ltd. v. Perumal, 1940 N.P.D. 1.
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striking workers but also against those who organize and promote in-
dustrial action.
In Murdoch v. Bullough 69 the defendant, an official of the South
African Industrial Federation Union (baking and milling section),
had declared a boycott designed to pressure the plaintiff baker into
replacing its black deliverymen with white employees. The defendant
advertised in newspapers and circulated notices calling upon union
members and sympathizers to boycott the plaintiff. The defendant
also approached regular customers of the plaintiff, advising them that
continued patronage of the plaintiff could result in action to their det-
riment. The plaintiff sought damages for defendant's unlawful and
malicious attempt to create a trade boycott against him.
Justice Mason distinguished legitimate trade union activities
from those of tortious industrial action: "one of the three fundamental
rules of justice is said to be not to harm one's neighbor; this is quali-
fied by another rule that a person is not to be regarded as doing wrong
or acting maliciously who merely exercises his own rights."' 70 The
defendant's concern that the plaintiff's refusal to employ a white
vanman was prejudicial to the union's interest did not find favor with
the court, and thus did not give the defendant the liberty to interfere
with the plaintiff's business.
7'
INTERFERENCE WITH TRADE OR BUSINESS
Murdoch v. Bullough authorizes actions based on interference
with trade or business. Its ambit is uncertain, but its effect is devastat-
ing to trade union business. The court does not make clear whether
unlawful means is a requirement for liability. Justice Gregorowski
did not require it: "I find it nowhere stated in the cases ... that you
are at liberty to injure a man in his trade as long as you do not use
unlawful means."'72 He did, however, find unlawful means: the "pub-
lication of circulars and advertisements seem to ... be illegal as they
are injurious to the plaintiff, they could have been interdicted. They
are calculated to harm the plaintiff ... Surely such publications are
not permissible.
'73
Justice Mason suggests that the criteria for establishing liability
69. 1923 T.P.D. 495.
70. Id. at 508.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 519.
73. Id.
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is whether the defendant had just cause, such as commercial competi-
tion. 74  Conceivably, had the plaintiff discriminated against white
workers, the defendant would have had just cause to pressure the
plaintiff to desist from treating members of the defendant's union less
favorably because of their race (or for that matter sex, marital status,
color, or ethnic or national origins).
7 5
In a 1958 English case, officials of the Musicians' Union were
held not liable for organizing a boycott of a dance-hall that ran a
color bar among dancers.76 The pursuit of the closed shop has been
justified as advancing the business interests both of employees and
employers by securing or maintaining the advantages of collective
bargaining.77 In Crofter, the principle of justification was further
extended:
A perfectly lawful strike may aim at dislocating the employer's
business for the moment, but its real object is to secure better
wages or conditions for the workers. The true contrast is, I think,
between the case where the object is the legitimate benefit of the
combiners and the case where the object is deliberate damage with-
out any such cause just.
7 8
Unlawful means to attach liability for interference with trade re-
quires clarity in our law. Murdoch v. Bullough establishes fundamen-
tal points of the common law without adequate discussion of the
principles. 79 Clearly, the defendant was liable under the Lex Aquil-
74. Id. at 508.
75. The Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, and the Race Relations Act, 1976, of the United
Kingdom prohibit discrimination on the grounds of race, sex or marital status in the selection
of employment. The legislation seeks to control both methods of selection designed to discrim-
inate against the groups in question (direct discrimination) and also methods of selection
which have the effect of disfavoring the group concerned even though not designed to achieve
that effect (indirect discrimination). Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, § (1)(a), (b). Under the
legislation it is unlawful for employers to make discriminating arrangements for selection for
employment, to make job offers on discriminating terms, or to engage in discriminatory refusal
or failure to offer employment. Id. § 6. Discriminatory job advertisements are made unlawful.
Id. § 38. Aggrieved applicants for employment or employees can complain to industrial tribu-
nals, which can grant declaration, compensation or recommendations that the employer cure
or mitigate discrimination. Id. §§ 63(1), 265(l). The Equal Opportunities Commission may
conduct formal investigations, issue non-discrimination notices and may bring County Court
proceedings for injunctions to restrain persistent discrimination. Id. §§ 67(2), 257(1), 271(1).
P. DAVIES & M. FREEDLAND, LABOUR LAW TEXT AND MATERIALS 450-55 (1979); R.
RIDEOUT & J. DYSON, supra note 9, at 319-44.
76. Scala Ballroom (Wolverhampton), Ltd. v. Ratcliffe, [1958] 3 All E.R. 220.
77. Reynolds v. Shopping Federation Ltd., [1924] 1 Ch. 28.
78. Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed v. Veitch, [1942] A.C. 435, 469.
79. Id. at 495.
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lia.80 The wrongfulness lies in the methods employed. The defend-
ant's exerted duress on customers to breach their contracts with the
plaintiff, and not to engage in any further dealings with him. Addi-
tionally, defendant's applied persuasion and pressure on those who
supplied goods to the plaintiff that he required for his trade. There-
fore, the conduct of the defendant was rightly censured by the court.
Indeed, for Justice Gregorowski, the plaintiff had been "threatened"
and "molested. '8 1  Damages are essential to the cause of action, and
must have either been incurred, or been about to incur, as a result of
the unlawful interference.
INDUCEMENT OF BREACH OF CONTRACT
Industrial action, whether it be striking, picketing, or secondary
action, invariably involves persuading employees to breach their con-
tract of employment with the employer in dispute, or the employer
not in dispute but who can use his position as customer or supplier to
apply pressure to the employer in dispute to reach a settlement.
Knowingly inducing (or procuring) a third party to breach his con-
tract to the damage of the other contracting party without reasonable
cause is a tort. 2 Thus, employers have a remedy in tort against in-
dustrial action aimed at breaches of employee contracts, as well as
against commercial contracts.8 3
For purposes of industrial action, it is important to distinguish
persuasion from the communication of mere information or advice.
"A mere statement of, or drawing of the attention of the party ad-
dressed to, the state of the facts as they are is not inducement but only
transmission of information; and before it becomes an inducement
giving rise to liability it must contain some element of pressure, per-
80. Id. at 516-17.
81. Id. at 495.
82. LEE & HONORE, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 306 (2d ed. 1978).
Intention is an essential component of this tort, negligence will not suffice. Alliance Building
Society v. Deretitch, 1941 T.P.D. 203, 216.
83. See A.J.T. Stratford & Son, Ltd. v. Lindley, [19651 A.C. 269, [19641 2 All E.R. 109
(H.L.). The watermen's union had put an embargo on barges hired out by Stratford Ltd.
(plaintiff). The Union officials (defendants) had instructed their members employed by the
hirers not to handle the barges (in breach of their employment contracts), so that existing
customers could not return their barges to the plaintiff at the end of their hiring contracts. The
object was to put pressure on the plaintiff. In response, Bowker and King Ltd., an associate of
the plaintiff, refused recognition to the union. The House of Lords found that liability in tort
existed for both inducing breach of employment contracts, as well as in respect of the hiring
contracts. Id.
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suasion or procurement.
' 8 4
LIABILITY IN TERMS OF THE LRA
Neither common law nor criminal law principles facilitate strike
action.85 Whatever freedom of strike exists in our society is to be
found in legislation. This freedom is circumscribed by provisions of
the Labour Relations Act. A strike that does not comply with the
provisions of section 65 is illegal. On this basis, the union in Dunlop
was restrained from inciting others to participate in the illegal
strike.86 Indeed, any "suggestion, proposal, request, exhortation, ges-
ture, argument, persuasion, inducement, goading, or the arousal of
cupidity"87 by the union with the object of influencing them to par-
take in a strike not sanctioned by the LRA, attracts criminal and civil
liability for both the inciter and the strikers.
INJUNCTIONS
The above analyses clearly indicate that the law favors the em-
ployer. In practice, however, the substantive law infrequently factors
into industrial disputes. The procedural remedy of an injunction is
invariably used by the employer to frustrate the endeavors of its oppo-
nent. The interdict effectively stops a strike action from proceeding,
pending trial of the substantial action. This notches a significant vic-
tory for the employer; he is relieved from the pressure to which he
would otherwise be subjected. Moreover, interim relief can be sought
and granted at great speed, thereby weakening the momentum of col-
lective action by the workers. Our courts are inclined to grant inter-
locutory interdicts to employers; both the balance of convenience, as
well as the prospect of the dispute being argued at the trial stage,
militate against the continuation of industrial action.88 Undoubtedly,
84. Evershed, M.R., in Thomson D. C. and Co. Ltd. v. Deakin, [1952] Ch. 646, 686.
85. See generally HOSTEN, EDWARDS, NATHAN & BOSMAN, INTRODUCTION TO SOUTH
AFRICAN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 158 (1977).
86. Dunlop S.A. Ltd. v. Metal and Allied Workers Union, 1985(1) S.A. 177(d), 178-79.
87. Id. at 188(E).
88. The requisites for the grant of an interim interdict pending determination of the main
action are categorized in Jones and Buckle as follows:
The applicant for such temporary relief must show:
(a) that the right which is the subject-matter of the main action and which he seeks
to protect by means of interim relief is clear or, if not clear, prima facie established,
though open to some doubt;
(b) that, where the right is only prima facie established, there is a well-grounded
apprehension of irreparable harm to the applicant if the interim relief is not granted
and he ultimately succeeds in establishing his rights;
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industrial action is disruptive of the orderly process of production, but
against this must be weighed the possibility that workers cannot
"strike while the iron is hot," the dispute in all probability is going to
be resolved on less favorable terms for the employees.
THE STATUTORY IMMUNITY
While the common law doctrines of tort render trade union ac-
tivities unlawful, legislation endeavors to encourage the spread of col-
lective bargaining arrangements. Section 79 of the LRA gives
immunity to registered unions, its office-bearers, officials and mem-
bers from the imposition of tortious liability for any act committed in
furtherance of a strike.89 The scope of the protection afforded by sec-
tion 79 depends upon two matters: the union must be registered, and
the strike must be lawful. 90 Paradoxically, most strikes in South Af-
rica are illegal and resorted to by unregistered unions.91 The require-
ment of a legal strike to enjoy the immunity falls within the
framework of a regulated system of collective bargaining. The ration-
ale in giving protection exclusively to registered trade unions is argua-
bly anachronistic. Not only does the LRA provide conciliatory
forums for resolution of disputes, involving an unregistered union, but
it also imposes rigorous requirements before the unregistered trade
union can lawfully engage in strike action. 92
(c) that the balance of convenience favors the granting of "interim relief."
P. JONES & H. BUCKLE, THE CIVIL PRACTICE OF THE MAGISTRATES' COURT IN SOUTH
AFRICA 71 (7th ed. 1980).
89. Section 79 reads as follows:
No civil legal proceedings shall be brought in any court of law against any registered
trade union or employers' organization, or against any member, office-bearer or offi-
cial of any such union or organization, in respect of any wrongful act committed by
that union or organization, or by that member, office-bearer or official on behalf of
that union or organization in furtherance of a strike or lock-out: Provided that this
section shall not apply to any act committed in furtherance of any strike or lock-out
in which, or in the continuation of which, any employee, employer or other person is
by section sixty-five forbidden to take part, or to any act the commission of which is a
criminal offense.
Labour Relations Act, supra note 3, § 79.
90. Registration of a union qualifies it for access to the institutions and facilities (e.g.,
stop orders for union dues) of the LRA. Id. § 6. For a strike to be lawful it must comply with
section 65.
91. The notable exceptions are the 1984 strikes of the National Mineworkers Union and
that of 1983 at Hammarsdale, Natal Thread Company.
92. Since the Labour Relations Amendment, Act 2 of 1983, an unregistered trade union,
provided it is representative of the employees, can apply for the establishment of a conciliation
board to endeavor to settle a dispute with the employer. See section 35. Moreover, section 65
prohibits a strike where no industrial council exists unless application has been made for the
establishment of a conciliation board.
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UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
An unemployed person participating in a work stoppage cannot
claim unemployment benefits. The Unemployment Insurance Act
93
disqualifies a contributor:
if he is unemployed by reason of a stoppage of work due to a trade
dispute in the industry in which he was employed or in any other
industry, so long as the stoppage of work continues, unless he has
during such stoppage of work become unemployed after becoming
bona fide employed elsewhere in suitable work, or unless he satis-
fies the claims officer that:
(i) he has at no time been a party to the dispute and had no direct
interest in the subject-matter of the dispute;
(ii) no person who was employed at the contributor's place of
employment in an occupation similar to the occupation in which
the contributor was employed, has at any time been such a party
nor so interested in the subject-matter of the dispute;
94
State neutrality is usually advanced to explain why social secur-
ity benefits should be withdrawn from those engaged in a trade dis-
pute. 95 For Rideout, the disentitlement of strikers is justified because
"the purpose of the insurance scheme is to protect those who become
unemployed through the ordinary fluctuations of trade or business
rather than because of strikes or lock-outs. '96
A person who during the stoppage becomes bona fide employed
elsewhere and thereafter finds himself unemployed falls outside the
scope of the disqualification. The second category of exemption from
the disqualification is problematic. The claimant must establish:
(i) that he was not participating in or directly interested in the
trade dispute which caused the stoppage of work, and
(ii) that none of his fellow-workers were party to or interested in
the dispute giving rise to the stoppage of work. The latter require-
ment was repealed in the English statute in 1975.97
93. Act No. 30 of 1966.
94. Id.
95. See R. RIDEOUT & J. DYSON, supra note 9, at 486. Section 19(1) of the Social Secur-
ity Act, 1975 (which is similar to § 35(13)(d) of Act 30 of 1966) is set out, and its provisions
critically analyzed.
96. See R. RIDEOUT & J. DYSON, supra note 9, at 487.
97. Section 19(l)(b) of the Social Security Act, 1975, was repealed by skill of the Employ-
ment Protection Act, 1975. Section 19(l)(b) read as follows: "that he does not belong to a
grade or class of workers of which, immediately before the commencement of the stoppage,
there were members employed at his place of employment any of whom are participating in or
financing or directly interested in the dispute." Social Security Act, 1975, § 19(l)(b).
[Vol. 11:281
1989] Freedom to Strike 303
The Donovan commission could find no adequate justification
for the "grade or class" provision in section 19(1)(b) of the Social
Security Act of 1975 as it
considers the position of workers in relation to a particular trade
dispute, not according to whether they are personally involved in
the dispute in the sense that they are individually participating in,
financing or directly interested in the dispute, but according to
whether they belong to a group of workers containing workers who
are personally involved. It assumes that a group of workers doing
much the same kind of work in the same place and under the same
conditions and circumstances have a corporate identity and a spe-
cial relationship one with another-a "community of interest"-
quite apart from their position in relation to any particular trade
dispute . . In our view the reasoning thus said to underlie the
grade or class provision is fallacious. In order to ascertain whether
a class of persons has a common interest simply because it is a class
one needs to know what common attribute it is which marks such
persons of as a class. This the law makes no attempt to do. It
simply assumes, apparently, that if a group of workers in the same
place of employment can by some means be identified as a "class"
or "grade" then automatically they possess a common interest as
such: and no investigation is required to possess a common interest
as such: and no investigation is required to disqualify them from
receiving unemployment benefit beyond discovering whether there
is at least one of the class participating in the trade dispute, or
financing it, or indirectly interested in it. This seems to us not so
much the recognition of an interest as the invention of it. The ca-
pricious results where the provision can and does produce are
themselves some indication of the invalidity of the assumption
which underlies it. If for example the process workers at a particu-
lar works go on strike on an issue which concerns them alone and
one member out of a total of 100 maintenance workers strikes in
sympathy, the remaining 99, if laid off, will all be disqualified from
receiving unemployment benefit, though they have no interest in
the strike and are indeed hostile to it.98
Thus, for the same reasons that found favor with the Donovon
Commission, the provisions of section 35(13)(1)(d)(ii) of the trade dis-
pute disqualification should be repealed.
Unlike English law, the dispute need not have occurred at the
98. Report of the Royal Commission of Trade Unions and Employers' Associations 1968.
Cmnd 3623, paras. 974-75. P. DAVIES & M. FREEDLAND, supra note 75, at 702-08.
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claimant's place of employment. 99 As long as the claimant is unem-
ployed by reason of a work stoppage, it does not matter whether the
trade dispute was in the industry where he was working, or in any
other industry, since either way he is disqualified. The onus is then
for the claimant to show that he falls within the exemption of the
section. He may seek to show that he is not a party to the dispute, nor
directly interested in the subject matter. In an English case, 1°° a col-
liery repairer lost employment due to a stoppage of brushers. Repair-
ers who could be required to work as brushers were offered such
work, but refused to take it. It was held that they were participating
in the dispute. In another decision, however, some form of active sup-
port was required. Thus, if the worker is prevented, against his will
from reporting for duty, he will not be held to be actively participat-
ing in the dispute on that ground alone.' 0 ' In Coates v. Modern Meth-
ods & Materials Ltd.,102 the Court of Appeal held that the test for
taking part in a dispute focuses on an employee's objective actions and
not his subjective motives. This approach is unsatisfactory since an
employee may support a strike out of fear or intimidation.
STRIKES AND UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The all-embracing definition of "unfair labor law practice"' 03
99. The Social Security Act, 1975, § 22.
100. R. RIDEOUT & J. DYSON, supra note 9, at 489.
101. See McCormick v. Horsepower Ltd., [1981] W.L.R. 993 (C.A.).
102. [1982] 3 W.L.R. 764. The case concerned two employees, Coates and Venables, who
were dismissed for taking part in a strike. They alleged that the Industrial Tribunal had juris-
diction to hear their claims of unfair dismissal because a third employee, Leith, had also partic-
ipated and had not been dismissed. See Employment Protection Consolidation Act, 1978,
§ 62. The employer had taken the view that Leith had not participated, because although she
had not gone-into work during the strike, this was not because she actively supported the
strike, but because she would receive abuse from fellow-workers if she were to work. The
Industrial Tribunal held that Leith was participating, and that consequently the Industrial
Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the claims of the other workers. The Employment Appeal
Tribunal allowed an appeal by the employer, but the Court of Appeal by a majority vote, in
turn allowed the appeal of the employees. Lord Justice Kerr (with whom Lord Justice
Stephensen concurred on the result) did not doubt that the employee's reasons or motives for
partaking in a strike were not relevant in determining whether or not the employee has partici-
pated. Lord Justice Eveleigh dissented, considering that motive was crucial. He took the view
that to participate in the strike the employee must be acting in concert with others, and that
this was not the case where the employee was not a willing participant. See also Naylor v.
Orton & Smith Ltd., [1983] I.C.R. 665 (E.A.T.).
103. Unfair labor practice means:
(a) any labor practice or any change in any labor practice, other than a strike or a lockout,
which has or may have the effect that:
(i) any employee or class of employees is or may be unfairly affected or that his or their
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crystallizes the need to create a body of law regulating the employ-
ment relationship. 104 Collective bargaining, the keystone of the La-
bour Relations Act, presupposes the availability of procedures for
regulating and resolving conflicts. The availability of these proce-
dures is advanced as the rationale for the specific exclusion of strikes
and lockouts in the definition of "unfair labor practice." Justice
Booysen in Dunlop makes the point:
One of the objectives of the Labour Relations Act is that employ-
ies shall not strike until an opportunity has been given for them to
meet their employers either in an industrial council, if one exists,
or, if not, by means of a conciliation board, to endeavor to settle
their differences. 1
0 5
In Ngobeni v. Vetsak (Co-op) Ltd. ,106 the Industrial Court, based
on similar reasoning, declined to reinstate employees who had been
dismissed for engaging in a work stoppage. The employer had refused
employment opportunities, work security or physical, economic, moral or social welfare is or
may be prejudiced or jeopardized thereby;
(ii) the business of any employer or class of employers is or may be unfairly affected or
disrupted thereby;
(iii) labor unrest is or may be created or promoted thereby;
(iv) the relationship between employer and employee is or may be detrimentally affected
thereby; or
(b) any other labor practice or any other change in any labor practice which has or may have
an effect which is similar or related to any effect mentioned in paragraph (a).
See Labour Relations Act, supra note 3, § i. An important function of the Industrial Court is
to settle disputes concerning alleged unfair labor practices. Id. § 17(ll)(f). DeKock aptly sums
up this function as follows: "[T]he industrial court is expected, if not encouraged to 'make a
new law' in building up precedents and especially in identifying 'unfair labor practices' and
determining disputes concerning such practices." A. DEKOCK, INDUSTRIAL LAWS OF SOUTH
AFRICA 622A (1984). The Wiehahn Report put it as follows:
In its deliberations, the industrial court should take into account the sociological,
economic, psychological, anthropological and other extra-legal factors that play a
role in the labor situation. In this regard the court should therefore also be able to
consider the socio-economic and socio-political implications of issues before it. This
would emphasize the considerations of equity as a basis for this court's decisions and
recommends that the industrial court, inter alia, investigates and hears alleged cases
of unfair dismissal, inequitable changes in conditions of employment, underpayment
of wages, unfair treatment and other case of grievances.
See WIEHAHN, supra note 8, at 96, 97. For a comprehensive analysis of the concept "unfair
labor practice," see S.A. Diamond Worker's Union v. S.A. Diamond Cutter's Association
(1982) 2 I.L.J. 87, 114-20. Where the court makes a finding of an unfair labor practice, it can
make such decisions "as it deems equitable having regard to all the circumstances." Thus, it
can make an order reinstating employees in their employment, where their dismissals consti-
tute an unfair labor practice. See A DEKOCK, supra note 103, at 624, 624(A).
104. N. Cassim, Unfair Dismissal, 5 I.L.J 275, 288-92 (1984).
105. Dunlop S.A. Ltd. v. Metal and Allied Workers Union, 1985(1) S.A. 177(0), 180(H).
Justice Booysen quotes de Kock, supra note 103, at 580-581.
106. (1984) 5 I.L.J. 205.
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the Union's request for stop-order facilities for union dues and a wage
increase. Instead of filing a suit under the unfair labor practice juris-
diction, the union members took strike action. The employer re-
sponded by dismissing the striking workers, who in turn applied to
the court for reinstatement orders. The response of the court was
predictable.
Notwithstanding the flagrant disregard of the machinery provided
by the Act for resolution of any grievances they might have had,
and their unlawful action in refusing to return to work, the appli-
cant's now seek protection under that very statute which they
choose to ignore.10 7
The court correctly held that management must retain the right
to employ the normal process of industrial discipline in the course of
an industrial dispute. But the presiding officer failed to realize that
management must treat all workers involved in a dispute equally. It
did not matter to the court that seventy-one percent of the dismissed
employees were subsequently re-employed. The remaining workers
had no remedy as "the unfairness of the dismissal is not sought in the
reasons of the dismissal, but in the result of the conclusion of a con-
tract of employment."'
' 0 8
In Die Raad van Mynvakbonde v. Die Kamer van Mynwese van
Suid-Afrika, the Industrial Court expressed the view that selective
dismissals and re-engagements of workers partaking in a lawful strike
may constitute an unfair labor practice. 0 9 Indeed, taking cognizance
of the liberty to strike guaranteed by the LRA upon compliance with
section 65, the court was of the view that employers could not readily
rely on their common law right to terminate the contract of employ-
ment when workers engage in a lawful strike. Such a dismissal may
well be an unfair labor practice, thereby enabling the court to order
the reinstatement of the dismissed workers. The court enumerated
the criteria that may be taken into consideration in determining
whether the termination of the employment relationship in the event
107. Id. at 214(A) and (B). See also Rikhoto v. Transvaal Alloys (Pty) Ltd., (1984) 5
I.L.J. 228. The Industrial Court cautions workers against resorting to strike action: "Mr.
Brassey suggested that the workers were entitled to stop work instead of coming to the indus-
trial court for redress. This is to fly in the face of the law. Even if the workers have to wait
three months . . . it still does not entitle them to take the law in their own hands." Id. at
242(H).
108. Ngobeni, (1984) 5 I.L.J. at 213(D).
109. (1984) 5 I.L.J. 344, 361.
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of a legal strike amounts to an unfair labor practice.110 The legal ef-
fect would be that the strike suspends the employment, which is re-
vived again when the strike is over.I'
The Ngobeni decision is distinguishable. The court was dealing
with an unlawful strike. Nevertheless, the court should have consid-
ered the reason why there was selective re-engagement. Clearly, it
cannot be good industrial relations practice to permit the employer to
dismiss all those who went on strike, and then to discriminate against
those employees involved in trade unions by not offering them re-
employment. Employees who strike illegally can only expect the pro-
tection of the court unless it can be shown that there had been
discrimination between employees-an unfair labor practice that
some employees have been sacked and some not, or that some have
been taken back and some not. The English legislation vests jurisdic-
tion in the Industrial Tribunal to consider the reasonableness of the
decision to sack or not to re-engage if the dismissals or offers of re-
engagement are selective."12 There is a three month time limit from
the date of dismissal after which the employer is permitted to re-em-
ploy any of the dismissed employees." 3 The three month rule weak-
ens the principle of no selectivity. For Lord Wedderburn, it "erodes
the solidarity of strikers" and "weaken(s) trade union action."" 1
4
CONCLUSION
Allan Flanders distinguishes a strike from an individual worker's
refusal to accept a job unless the employer improves his offer.' '5 The
assumption behind every strike is not that the workers will seek em-
110. Id. at 361 (C)-(H).
S11. Y. Claasen, 'Stakings reg - 'n nuwe teorie', (1978) T.R.W. 1-20. See also Lord Den-
ning's observations in Morgan v. Fry, [1968] 2 Q.B. 710.
The truth is that neither employer nor workmen wish to take the drastic action of
termination if it can be avoided. The men do not wish to leave their work for ever.
The employers do not wish to scatter their labor force to the four winds. Each side
is, therefore, content to accept a "strike notice" of proper length as lawful. It is an
implication read into the contract by the modem law as to trade disputes. If a strike
takes place, the contract of employment is not terminated. It is suspended during the
strike: and revives again when the strike is over.
Id. at 728.
112. Employment Protection Consolidation Act, 1978, § 62. See also I. SMITH & J.
WOOD, INDUSTRIAL LAW 254 (2d ed. 1983).
113. Section 62 amended by section 9 of the Employment Act, 1982. See Wallington,
(1983) 46 M.L.R. 310; Midland Plastics v. Till, (1983) I.R.L.R. 9.
114. Clark & Wedderburn, supra note 36, at 140.
115. A. FLANDERS, MANAGEMENT AND UNIONS: THE THEORY AND REFORM OF INDUS-
TRIAL RELATIONS 213-20 (1970).
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ployment elsewhere if the employer fails to meet their demands. On
the contrary, the objective of the striking workers is to get reinstated
as soon as possible upon resolution of the dispute. Where the em-
ployer has replaced the strikers by other workers, the strike ceases to
be an effective sanction and turns into a futile gesture. Both the objec-
tive and behavior of strike action is encapsulated in the definition sug-
gested by Davies and Freedland:
A strike is therefore a temporary refusal to work in accordance
with the prevailing employment contracts (or on other conditions
that are not specified or implied in the contracts), combined with
the firm intention, at least on the part of the great majority of
workers involved, of not terminating their contracts. And even in
those cases where workers strike in spontaneous protest, without
any calculation of the prospect of success, it is still the case that:
sooner or later, however bitter the dispute, employees must work
and the employer must have them return to work. It is no answer
to suggest that the individual may elect to seek another place of
employment; the employee body must remain. A few defections
will not change the character or problems of the body.'
1 6
The Labour Relations Act is predicated on the belief that the
price of labor and other terms and conditions of employment should
be fixed by collective bargaining. For Cox, Bok and Gormon, man-
agement and labor get together where the law promotes negotiations
over the terms of a collective bargaining contract. Another factor
that makes collective bargaining work is the strike. It is through the
appreciation that the risks of losses that a strike can cause are so great
that compromise is cheaper than economic battle: "the strike or the
fear of a strike is the motive power that makes collective bargaining
operate." 117
The LRA recognizes the function that strikes serve. As long as
our labor policy is predicated on the system of collective bargaining,
the risk of strikes cannot be wholly eliminated. The anomaly is that
in practice most strikes occur without compliance with section 65,
and hence are illegal. Section 65 of the LRA, in essence, preserves the
right to strike as a last resort and after the work-force has exhausted
all attempts at direct negotiation, including the facilities of third-party
intervention, to reach a settlement.
116. P. DAVIES & M. FREEDLAND, supra note 75, at 14.
117. A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 484 (9th
ed. 1981).
[Vol. 11:281
Freedom to Strike
Clearly, then, the workers need the protection of the law while
engaged in a lawful strike. Section 65 of the LRA will be a justifiable
restriction on strike action, provided that the employees are protected
against dismissal while engaged in a lawful strike. The reasons are
overwhelming. First, the right to strike is extensively regulated, on
the premise that the LRA creates forums for negotiation and concilia-
tion. Second, by enjoining the dismissal of employees partaking in a
legal strike the aspirations of the LRA will be fulfilled by maintaining
an orderly and just balance of power between management and labor.
Third, the Industrial Court has indicated that the dismissal of law-
fully striking workers may constitute an unfair labor practice.
The right to strike is not a fundamental human right. The appli-
cable laws of the countries surveyed in this Article exemplify that le-
gitimate restrictions can be imposed on strike action. It is also clear
that the common law favors the employer. Ensuring that workers
cannot be dismissed while partaking in a legal strike,"18 while also
extending immunity from tortious liability in cases of lawful strikes to
unregistered unions, its officials and members, will make the law ap-
pear fair and command the respect of those contemplating industrial
action.
118. In terms of the German precedent, striking workers will not be entitled to any wages.
See supra note 41.
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